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Abstract 
 
Corporations discover that social responsibility pays off. However, sometimes doing 
what is ethical will prove costly to a company. The purpose of this article is to clarify 
this trade-off by developing an economic model that describes the choice between 
profits and principles. The model is used to analyse how external factors like a 
change in consumer interests and competitiveness affect the relationship between 
profits and principles. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Corporate social responsibility is a trendy topic. Many companies are concerned about 
values like integrity and develop ethical codes to foster responsible behaviour of their 
employees (Kaptein et al, 1999). Firms find it increasingly important to behave like corporate 
citizens. Recent research shows that 78% of directors of medium sized Dutch companies 
agree that the company should contribute to solve social problems (van Luijck, 2000). 
Companies should not only create economic value, but also consider the ecological and social 
effects of their operations. They must meet the triple P bottom line expressing the 
expectations of stakeholders with respect to the company’s contribution to profit, planet and 
people (Shell, 1999; SER, 2001). 
There are several trends that explain the interest in corporate social 
responsibility.1 First, the seventies have shown that there are limits to the controlling power 
of the government. Therefore, the government seeks ways to involve business by deregulating 
certain tasks (Jeurissen, 2000). Second, the globalisation of the world economy intensifies 
ethical problems related to cultural differences, for example with respect to the issue of 
human rights. Since we lack a strong international government, international companies 
trading in countries in which human rights are not protected have a special responsibility 
because of their power (Chryssides and Kaler, 1993). Third, new technologies confront firms 
with new ethical issues, like the privacy of users of Internet or the risks of new technologies 
like biogenetic food (Jeurissen, 2000; Vedder, 2001). A fourth reason is the environmental 
concern. Because pollution has no price, firms will tend to pollute more than is optimal from 
a social point of view. As the potential of the government to put a price on pollution by, for 
example, fines or other penalties is limited, there is a social need that companies take 
responsibility by themselves to develop production techniques that save the environment. A 
final reason is the increasing economic disparity worldwide. In the last two centuries the ratio 
between the average income per capita of the richest country (say Switzerland) and the 
poorest country (say Ethiopia) has increased from about 5:1 to 56:1.2 Such large income 
disparities are probably not sustainable and may stimulate economic migration from South to 
North. 
                                            
1
 Besides corporate social responsibility, several other related terms have been developed, 
like corporate social responsiveness, corporate social policy process, corporate citizenship, corporate 
rectitude and community involvement. See Johan J. Verstraeten (1997). 
2
  See Landes (1998) and UNDP (1996). 
These trends create a vacant responsibility. It is, however, uncertain whether firms 
will respond positively to this challenge. The growing dynamics and resulting uncertainty in 
the economy caused by the globalization and the ICT revolution may shift the focus of firms 
from long-term strategies to short-term strategies. As a result, reputation may become less 
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important and this may reduce the incentive to integrate social effects in the firm’s policy. 
Also the increased competition and higher flexibility of financial capital may force firms to 
pay more attention to profitability at the costs of social goals like environment or employees 
rights. Hence, what makes us feel comfortable that business will take up the challenge posed 
by the trends mentioned above? 
The first incentive comes from direct stakeholders who can punish the firm when its 
operations are not in line with the moral expectations of these stakeholders.3 The rise in 
welfare and in the skill level have made consumers more interested in the ethical aspects of  
products. Especially in those issues that have a direct impact on the consumer’s stake, health 
issues etc. But also in broader ethical issues. Firms who do not meet the expectations of 
consumers have a higher probability of losing their reputation with a negative impact on 
market shares and profitability (McIntosh et al, 1998). This also impacts the stock market. 
Financial institutions or private persons will not invest their money in companies with actual 
or potential social and environmental liabilities, because they want to avoid the risk of 
owning a company that suddenly owes huge fines or faces drastic consumer boycotts (Daviss, 
1999).4 
The second incentive comes from an increasing impact of NGO’s and the media, 
partly due to technological innovations that make the gathering of information much cheaper 
and the organisation of networks easier. If the media discovers that a company in some or 
another way misuses the trust given by society, it will be very difficult to maintain its 
reputation. 
These incentives explain why ethics pays itself partly back. As people come to expect 
corporations to take a larger social role, companies will develop a social identity that is as 
important as brand identity. Indeed, if a company completely disregards ethics, the continuity 
of the company is highly uncertain in the long run (Velasquez, 1998).  This changes the 
very nature of business and creates win-win situations. However, this is not the only 
way to interpret the relationship between profits and ethics. Sometimes doing what is 
ethical will prove costly to a company. Ethical behaviour is not always rewarded by a 
competitive advantage over companies that are not ethical. There may be decreasing 
returns to considering social goals. If so, what is an optimal policy for an individual firm? 
And how is this policy affected by such external changes as described above? 
                                            
3
 Mitchell et al (1997) distinguish between various types of stakeholders. They argue that the 
various classes of stakeholders might be identified upon the possession of the attributes power, 
legitimacy and urgency. 
4
 Hence, also the stock prices will be negatively affected if the reputation is damaged by 
unethical behaviour becoming known. For an empirical research confirming this effect, see Rao and 
Hamilton (1996). 
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In order to shed light on these questions, section 2 develops an economic 
model that describes the trade-off between profits and ethical principles. In our 
analysis, we reduce the triple P bottom line to two P’s, profits and principles. The 
latter captures the two other P’s of the triple P bottom line, planet and people.5 This 
model analyses the impact of consumer concerns, competition on the goods market 
and the intertemporal trade-off between short term profitability and long-term 
reputation on the ethical standards of the company. The trade-off is modelled by 
assuming imperfect competition on the output and the capital market. 
In section 2 it is assumed that firms maximize profits. Following some studies 
in health economics6, section 3 introduces ethical principles as an explicit argument 
in the goal function of the company. In contrast to section 2, this allows solutions in 
which the profitability declines with a rise in principles. 
In some cases, the model does not yield an optimal solution. Section 4 
therefore further extends the model by introducing corner solutions by adding two 
external restrictions to the choice-set of the company. The first restriction represents 
the power of the government to force a minimum level of principles. The second 
restriction introduces a maximum level of principles by assuming a minimum level of 
profitability required to assure the financial continuity of the firm. Next, we analyse 
the impact of a decreasing power of the government and an increase in the 
competitiveness on the capital market on the trade-off between profits and 
principles.  
The last section summarizes the main results and mentions some questions 
for future research. 
 
2 Profit maximisation and principles 
 
This section develops a partial equilibrium model that describes the trade off 
between profits and principles. 
First, we describe the output market and production function of an individual 
firm and derive the optimal price set by the firm. It is assumed that the 
(representative) firm operates on a monopolistic competitive market. The production 
costs depend on the level of principles of the firm. Furthermore, the market share on 
the output market depends on the reputation of the firm. In particular, we introduce a 
state of a good reputation and a state of a bad reputation and assume that the 
                                            
5
  Of course, in reality the corporate social performance is a multidimensional variable which 
captures a wide variety of inputs. For example, Waddock and Graves (1997) use a weighted index 
consisting of five aspects of key stakeholder relations (community relations, employee relations, 
performance with respect to the environment, product characteristics and treatment of women and 
minorities) and three aspects related to external pressures. 
6
 For an overview, see McGuire (2000), pp. 521-22. 
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transition rates between these states depend on the level of principles of the firm. 
Since the price set by the firm generates no spillovers to the future, the firm selects 
an output price that maximizes short-term profits. The model is closed by assuming 
that the number of firms is so large, that the share of the representative firm is 
negligible. Hence, a change in the share of firms with a good reputation does not 
affect the behaviour of the individual firm. 
Next, we introduce an intertemporal flow model and define the transition rates 
between the two reputation states. We investigate the impact of principles on 
long-term profitability and derive the so-called profit principle restriction that defines 
the choice set for the company.  
 
Third, we model the optimal level of principles that maximizes long-term 
profits and investigate how firms reacts to external changes in the output market and 
production function. We compare the level of principles of firms with a good and a 
bad reputation and derive the share of firms with a good reputation in the (flow) 
equilibrium state.  
 
Output market, production function and short-term profit 
 
The firm is assumed to operate on a monopolistic competitive market with n 
heterogenous consumer goods. The demand for goods is derived from the utility 
function of a representative consumer, which is specified by the following 
CES-function: 
 
            k=ng                       k=n (1) u = {(δg/n)1+ς  Σ (yg,k-ς) + (δb/n)1+ς  Σ (yb,k-ς)}-ς  δg ≥ δb 
            k=1                       k=ng 
 
where u denotes utility, n the (exogenous) total number of (symmetric) firms (one 
firm supplying one good), ng and nb (equal to n-ng) the number of firms with a good 
respectively bad reputation, k the index of an individual firm, δg and δb autonomous 
scale factors for firms with a good respectively bad reputation, yg and yb the 
consumer good of firms with a good respectively bad reputation and ς a parameter 
reflecting the substitutability between different goods. Following Quinn (1998), we 
assume there are two situations: a state in which the firm has a good reputation (or 
quality) and a state in which the firm has a bad reputation.7 Besides for analytical 
convenience, this assumption also expresses the incidental character of a change in 
reputation. One serious infringement, like the use of child labour for the production 
of textiles or the sale of goods with defects that highly damage the health of 
                                            
7
 Alternatively, one can model reputation as a continuous variable analogues to the stock of 
health in the health economics literature. See, for example, Ried (1998).  
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consumers, can destroy the good reputation of a firm for a number of years. Goods 
with a good reputation are valued as least as high as goods with a bad reputation (δg 
≥ δb). Finally, it is noted that changes in the share of firms with a good reputation 
also changes the utility function of the consumer. Indeed, equation (1) can be 
interpreted as an actualisation of a more general potential utility function with n 
goods that can have both a good reputation and a bad reputation. 
The demand for goods for an individual firm can be derived as: 
 
(2) yi = (δi/n) (Y/py) (pyi / py)-η    η > 1; i = g,b 
 
where η (defined as 1/(1+ς)) reflects the degree of competition, Y the (exogenous) 
total consumer demand for goods, pyi the price of the individual firm (with a good 
respectively bad reputation) and py the weighted CES price index defined as: 
                       k=ng                   k=n (3) py = {(δg/n) Σ (pyg,k(1-η))+ (δb/n) Σ (pyb,k(1-η))}1/(1-η) 
                       k=1                   k=ng 
 
Since it assumed that n is very large, the impact of the price of the individual 
company on the weighted aggregate price is negligible. Therefore, although the 
share of firms with a good reputation respectively bad reputation can change in 
response to changes in the parameters (see below), this will not affect the demand 
curve for the individual firm. 
The probability of a good reputation is related to the ethical standard of the 
firm (see below). Although firms with a low ethical standard can initially have a good 
reputation, they face a higher risk of losing this position and enter the state with a 
bad reputation. Firms can reduce this probability by raising the ethical standards, but 
then they incur some additional operation costs. 
To describe production costs, we assume a simple linear production function. 
Besides the costs for direct input factors, the firm spends some operating costs to 
maintain some principles, for example, with respect to safety standards or audit 
activities. Profits in state i can therefore be defined as: 
 
(4) pii = (pyi - c(di)) yi  i = g,b ;  ∂c/∂d>0 
 
where d denotes the level of ethical principles and c the production costs per unit 
product. It is assumed that the production costs depend positively on the level of 
principles. 
Since the price set by the firm generates no reputation effect, in each state 
the firm sets the output price in such a way that it maximizes short-term profits. This 
gives the following standard mark-up pricing rule: 
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(5) max (arg pyi) pii = (pyi - c(di)) (δi/n) (Y/py) (pyi / py)-η  ----> pyi = η c(di) / (η-1) 
 
Combining equations (2) and (4) - (5) gives the following reduced form equation for 
short-run profits: 
 
(6) pii = ξ δi (c(di))1-η   ,  ∂pii /∂di < 0 
 
with ξ = (Y/py)(1/n)(py/η)η (η-1)η-1, which is independent of the reputation of the firm. 
Furthermore, note that profits are negatively related to the level of principles (see the 
appendix). This implies that the profit in a state of a good reputation does not 
necessarily exceed the profit in a state of a bad reputation. If the scale parameters δi 
do not significantly differ and the level of principles is higher in the case  of a good 
reputation (see below), the production costs per unit product for firms with a good 
reputation are relatively high and pig will be lower than pib. 
 
Long-term profits 
 
The firm sets the level of principles to maximize its long-term profits (w). It can be 
shown from the dynamic programming approach (see e.g. Diamond (1982), 
Holmlund and Lindén (1993) and Pissarides (1990)) that in the steady state we have 
the following Bellman functions in the two states: 
 
(7) ρ wg = pig  + fg(dg) (wb - wg)   fg > 0; ∂fg/∂dg < 0; ∂2fg/∂dg2>0 
 
(8) ρ wb = pib  + fb(db) (wg - wb)   fb > 0; ∂fb/∂db > 0; ∂2fb/∂db2<0 
 
ρ denotes the rate of time preference. fg is the probability of moving from a state of a 
good reputation to a state of a bad reputation. The probability to lose the good 
reputation depends negatively on the level of principles. However, the second order 
derivative of principles is assumed to be positive. That means: the marginal impact 
of the level of principles on the probability to lose the good reputation decreases with 
the level of principles. fb denotes the probability of restoring its reputation. 
Bovenberg (2000) argues that firms that have lost their good reputation, will not be 
able to reenter a state of good reputation. However, if consumers have a relatively 
short memory, it will be easy for a firm to restore its reputation. For example, when 
the public found out that Ford had deliberately chosen for a dangerous position of 
the gas tank in the Ford Pinto causing the death of many motorists in the seventies, 
the American consumer was furious. Ford reacted by terminating the production of 
the Pinto. Fortunately for Ford this accident caused no permanent damage of its 
reputation (NRC, 2000). It is assumed that fb depends positively on the level of 
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principles. The second order 
derivative is assumed to be 
negative: if the level of principles 
increases, the probability of 
restoring the reputation rises 
degressively. 
 
The impact of principles on 
long-term profits  
 
In order to investigate the impact of 
principles on long-term profits, we rewrite equation (7) and equation (8) as: 
 
(9) wi = {pii + fi (pij - pii) / h} / ρ     i=g,b; j=b,g 
 
where h =ρ + fg + fb. From equation (9) the marginal impact of principles on 
long-term profits can be defined as: 
 
(10) ∂wi/∂di = {∂pii/∂di +  ∂fi/∂di (pij - pii)/h}(1- fi /h) / ρ 
 
Since (1- fi /h) / ρ is unambiguously positive, the sign of ∂wi/∂di depends on the term 
between braces, which is related to the negative impact of principles on short-term 
profits (∂pii/∂di) and to the marginal impact of principles on the flow rates (∂fi/∂di) 
multiplied by the profit differential in the two states (pij-pii) and divided by the sum of 
the transition rates and the rate of time preference (h). Since this profit differential 
can either be positive or negative, the sign of ∂wi/∂di is ambiguous. As is shown in 
the appendix, the second-order effect of principles on long-term profits (∂2wi /∂di2) is 
also ambiguous. 
Equation (9) is graphically illustrated by Figure 1. The vertical axes depicts 
the long-term profit (wi), the horizontal axes the level of principles (di). The curve 
reflects the restriction on the choice of the company. Let us call this the 
profit-principle restriction curve, or more shortly, the PPR curve. The shape of the 
PPR curve can have several forms. First, if ∂wi/∂di is unambiguously negative (which 
is, for example, the case if pig < pib), the PPR curve is negatively sloped as expressed, 
for example, by curve 1 in Figure 1. The PPR curve might also have a hump shape if 
∂wi/∂di is initially positive and only becomes negative if d exceeds a certain level, like 
in curve 2. Indeed, some empirical studies (like Posnikoff (1997) and Waddock and 
Graves (1997)) suggest that (long-term) profitability is positively related to the ethical 
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standard.8 Ethical aspects of firm behaviour for which this win-win relationship 
between profits and principles hold are, for example, integrity of employees and the 
prevention of corruption and bribery. Companies that invest in these working 
patterns, for example by developing ethical codes and auditing processes, raise the 
transparency of their organisation and reduce the probability of an incident that 
harms their reputation. However, the marginal profits from raising the ethical 
standing of the firm might decline with the ethical level of the firm and, at some 
turning point (A), become negative. This marks the borderline of the win-win area of 
the PPR curve. In point A, an additional increase in the level of principles results in a 
decline of w. 
                                            
8
 There are, however, several other studies that find a neutral or negative relationship 
between profits and principles. See McWilliams and Siegel (2001). 
If ∂wi/∂di is unambiguously positive, the PPR curve will be upward sloping 
(curve 3). Alternatively, if ∂wi/∂di is initially negative but becomes positive at a certain 
level of d, the PPR curve will be U-shaped (curve 4). In both these latter cases, the 
solution of the maximization problem of the company is characterized by infinite 
profits and principles. This is highly unlikely, since empirical trends in world wide 
income distributional parameters and ecological indicators suggest a lack of social 
and ecological sustainability, indicating that the scope for such a win-win perspective 
is limited. Indeed, although we cannot rule out the opposite, it is likely that the 
negative impact of principles on short-term profits will rise with the level of principles, 
whereas the returns from a higher probability of a good reputation is likely to fall. 
Therefore, in the rest of the paper we abstract from these latter two possibilities. 
 
Optimal level of principles 
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In this section we assume that the PPR curve can be characterized by a hump 
shape (curve 2), both for firms with a good reputation and for firms with a bad 
reputation.9 From equation (10) the first order condition for an optimal level of 
principles that maximizes long-term profits can be defined as: 
 
(11) ∂pii/∂di +  (∂fi/∂di) (pij - pii) / h = 0 
 
Equation (11) expresses that the marginal reduction in short-term profits must 
balance the marginal returns from a reduction in the probability of being in a state of 
bad reputation. The total differentiation of equation (11) reads: 
 
(12) p0 _di = _ ∂pii/∂di + p1 _(pig -pib) + p2 _ ∂fi/∂di + p3 _ h 
 
with p0 = -∂2 wi /∂di2 > 0 
p1 = - ∂fg/∂dg / h > 0  if i=g ;   p1 = fb/∂db / h > 0 if i=b 
p2 = (pib-pig) / h < 0  if i=g;  p2 = (pig-pib) / h > 0 if i=b  
p3 = (∂fi/∂di) (pij - pii) / h2 < 0 
 
The signs of p0, p2 and p3 are necessary conditions (although not sufficient 
conditions) for a hump shape of the PPR curve, whereas the sign of p1 follows from 
the assumptions made in equations (7) and (8). From equation (12) it follows that 
the optimal level of principles is higher if: 
 
- the marginal impact of principles on short-term profits (∂pii/∂di) is less 
negative; 
- the fall in profits after the loss of a good reputation (pig -pib) is higher; 
- the marginal impact of principles on the transition rates to a state with a bad 
respectively good reputation (∂fi/∂di) is lower (for i=g) respectively higher (for 
i=b). 
- the transition rates and rate of time preference are lower (h) 
                                            
9
  For the case of curve 1, see section 4. Furthermore, note that the model includes the 
possibility that the shape of the PPR curve of a firm with a good reputation differs from the shape of 
the PPR curve of a firm with a bad reputation, because this shape depends on ∂fi/∂di which can differ 
substantially for i=g and i=b. 
The marginal impact of principles on short-term profits is affected by the marginal 
impact of principles on production costs (∂ci/∂di), the competitiveness on the goods 
market (η) and the autonomous market shares (δi). The latter two variables also 
affect the profit differential between the state of a good and bad reputation (for a 
derivation, see the appendix). Box 1 reports the influence of these underlying 
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exogenous variables and the other exogenous variables that affect the optimal level 
of principles for both regimes (good and bad state). Below, we discuss these effects 
in more detail. 
 
Box 1 Impact of exogenous variables on the optimal level of principles 
 
 
 
∂cg/∂dg 
 
∂cb/∂d
b 
 
η 
 
δg - δb 
 
∂fg/∂d
g 
 
∂fb/∂db 
 
fg 
 
fb 
 
ρ 
 
dg 
 
 − 
 
 
 
 − 
 
 ? 
 
 −  
 
 
 
 −  
 
 − 
 
 − 
 
db 
 
 
 
 − 
 
 − 
 
 + 
 
  
 
 + 
 
 − 
 
 − 
 
 − 
 
The marginal impact of principles on production costs (∂ci/∂di) 
 
More and more managers become aware that if an organisation respects the 
individual employee, he will respond with a loyalty and a commitment to the 
organisation which will increase productivity (Wirtz, 1999). This reduces the marginal 
production costs of principles. If a corporate social responsibility policy that raises 
the social values within the firm will become less costly, the optimal level of 
principles will rise. 
 
The competitiveness on the goods market (η) 
 
Another factor that impacts the trade-off between profits and principles is the 
competitiveness on the goods market. An increase in the competitiveness on the 
goods market induces a fall in the level of principles, because it both raises the 
negative impact of principles on short-term profits and reduces the profit differential 
between a state of a good and a bad 
reputation. 
Figure 2 presents a graphical 
illustration of the effect of increasing 
competitiveness on the good market. 
Since profits fall and the negative 
marginal impact of principles on 
short-run profits increases, the PPR 
curve shifts downward and to the left. 
As a result, the optimal level of 
principles that maximizes long-term 
profits will fall from A to B. 
This shows that there is a trade-off between the (macro) economic 
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advantages and the social and environmental disadvantages of more competition on 
the goods market. This puts restrictions on the traditional task of the government to 
stimulate competition between firms by an active antitrust policy and other kinds of 
market regulation that raise the transparency of the market and reduce transactions 
costs. Although a rise in the competitiveness will generally increase the consumer 
surplus by lowering the mark-up of prices over marginal cost, it may decrease the 
social and ecological efforts of the firm. If the latter effects dominate, the total 
welfare effect may be negative.  
 
The fall in autonomous market share after the loss of a good reputation (δg -  δb) 
 
A third factor that affects the trade-off between profits and principles is the 
autonomous market share (δi). After the discovery of unethical aspects firms may be 
confronted with a consumer boycott of their products. The strength of the boycott 
depends on the attitude of consumers. If a lot of consumers are sensitive to the 
social effects of the operations of the firm, the discovery of the lapse may invoke a 
mass response of the public with dramatic consequences for the firm. If, on the 
other hand, only a small group of activistic consumers are prepared to pay the price 
of boycotting the firm, the expected decline in profits upon discovery of ethical lapse 
will be small and firms will be tempted to chose a lower level of principles. 
A change in the autonomous market share has two effects. First, it increases 
the negative marginal impact of principles on short-term profits. This effect tends to 
be relatively small, because the direct impact of δi on ∂pii/∂di (see equation A(1) in the 
appendix) is partly balanced by the indirect impact of δi on ∂pii/∂di through ξ by 
changing py in equation (3).10 Second, a change in δi will generally affect the 
difference in profits between the state of a good and a bad reputation if it shifts the 
relative magnitude of δb compared to δg (see equation A(3) in the appendix). 
In the model, a rise in the sensitiveness of consumers to the ethical standards 
of the firm can be interpreted as a rise in δg - δb. Based on the first effect on the 
marginal impact of principles on short-term profits, this will generate relatively small 
effects on the level of principles in the two states. Based on the second effect on the 
profit differential between the state of a good and bad reputation, a rise in δg - δb has 
an unambiguous positive impact on the level of principles in both states. If the 
second effect dominates, a higher preference of consumers for the social quality of 
the goods delivered by the company will increase the level of principles in both 
states. 
 
The (marginal) transition rates (∂fi/∂di and fi) 
                                            
10
 In the extreme case that ng or nb is zero, the net impact of δi on ∂pii/∂di is zero. 
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The transition rates between a state of a good reputation and a state of a bad 
reputation (fi) and the marginal impact of principles on these transition rates (∂fi/∂di) 
will change if the influence of the NGOs and the role of the media increases, 
strengthening the transparency of the firm. A company’s ethical lapse can now be flashed 
to news outlets and brokerage firms globally before a CEO can hurry back from lunch. This 
makes companies more cautious and more inclined to take care that their acts are in line with 
the expectations of the society. 
An increase in the negative marginal impact of principles on the transition rates in the 
state of a good reputation (-∂fg/∂dg) or in the positive marginal impact of principles on the 
transition rate in the state of a bad reputation (∂fb/∂db) raises the level of principles by 
enforcing the reputation effect and, hence, increasing the marginal returns from principles. 
The impact of the transition rate itself (fi) is, however, negative, because it reduces the 
marginal impact of principles on the probability to be in a state with a bad (for i=g) 
respectively good reputation (for i=b). The impact of the transition rate in the other state (fj) is 
also negative. For example, if fb is relatively high because consumers have a short 
memory, it will be easy for a firm to restore its reputation anyway. For a firm in a 
state with a good reputation this makes it less attractive to reduce the probability of 
having a bad reputation by raising the level of principles. 
 
The rate of time preference (ρ) 
 
Another factor affecting the weight of future profits in long-term profits is the time of 
preference. If the rate of time preference increases, the firm will focus more on 
short-term profits whereas the weight of the change in future profits caused by a 
change in the reputation declines. In this respect, the growing dynamics of the 
economy as a result of, for example, the high speed of technological inventions, is 
worrying. It may induce a focus on short-term profits, because it is more difficult for 
economic agents to assess future developments in the market. Because of the high 
uncertainty, economic agents will be inclined to employ a higher rate of time 
preference. As a result of the associated shorter time horizons and increased 
‘short-term’ thinking, the discounted benefits of maintaining a high reputation 
decline. 
 
Difference in optimal level of principles in a state of a good and a bad reputation 
 
Equation (11) can also be used to analyse in what direction the firm will adapt its 
level of principles if it changes from a state of a good reputation to a state of a bad 
reputation. For this purpose, we rewrite equation (11) by substituting equation (6). 
Dividing that for the good and bad state gives: 
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(13) (c(dg)-η ∂c/∂dg) / (c(db)-η ∂c/∂db) = (- ∂fg/∂dg / ∂fb/∂db) (δb / δg) 
 
If it assumed that the marginal cost of principles rises with the level of principles (in 
particular, if ∂2ci/∂di2 > η (∂ci/∂di)2/ci, see the appendix) , we can rewrite equation (13) 
as: 
(14) dg / db = H((- ∂fg/∂dg / ∂fb/∂db) (δb / δg)) 
 
where H symbolizes a function with H’>0. Equation (14) implies three results. First, it 
shows that the relative level of principles in the state of a good reputation compared 
to a state of a bad reputation is independent of the difference in the profit levels of 
the two states, because the profit differential affects the expected future benefits of 
principles in the same way. Instead, and that is the second point, it does depend on 
the marginal impact of the principles on the transition rates. This implies that if  the 
marginal impact of principles on the probability of regaining a good reputation is 
relatively high, the level of principles in a state of a bad reputation can be higher 
than in the state of a good reputation. Third, equation (14) shows that the relative 
level of principles is negatively related to the relative autonomous market share. 
Since the relative autonomous market share decreases the marginal impact of 
principles on profits, it exerts a negative impact on the relative level of principles. 
 
Flow equilibrium 
 
Once the optimal choices of firms in a state of a good respectively bad reputation 
are determined, we can derive the share of firms with a good reputation respectively 
bad reputation. In particular, in the flow equilibrium state the flow of firms from a 
state of a good reputation to a state of a bad reputation is equal to the flow of firms 
from a state of a bad reputation to a state of a good reputation, i.e. 
 
(15) fg(dg) ng = fb(db) (n - ng) 
 
where dg (db) denotes the optimal level of principles of companies in a good 
(respectively bad) state, ng the number of companies in a good state and n the total 
number of companies. Rewriting for the share of companies in a good state gives: 
 
(16) ng / n = 1 / (fg(dg) / fb(db) + 1) 
 
Since it is assumed that both fg and fb are positive, the share of companies in a good 
state will always lie in between 0 and 1. Taking the total differentiation yields: 
 
  14 
(17) _(ng / n)  = - χ(∂fg/∂dg) _dg + χ(fg(dg) / fb(db)) (∂fb/∂db) _db  
 
with χ= 1 / [fb(db)(fg(dg) / fb(db) + 1)2] > 0. Equation (17) illustrates the evident finding 
that the share of firms operating in the state of a good reputation depends positively 
on the level of principles chosen by firms both in the state of a good reputation and 
in the state of a bad reputation. 
Finally, it can easily be shown that the flow equilibrium state is stable, since: 
 
(18) _ng  = fb n - (fg + fb) ng 
 
The root of equation (18) is negative, implying that the flow equilibrium state will 
restore after a temporary shock in ng. 
 
3 Intrinsic valuation of principles 
 
In this section we also include ethical principles as an explicit argument in the goal 
function of the company and model the trade-off between this ethical concern 
against (long-term) profitability. Including ethical principles is interesting for two 
reasons. First, as argued by Van Luijk (2000), firms sometimes also intrinsically 
value principles. Treating principles as an explicit argument in the goal function 
therefore enables us to analyse the impact of this interest on the trade-off between 
profits and principles. Second, the introduction of principles as an goal variable also 
changes some of the findings in section 2. In particular, because of the intrinsic 
interest in principles, firms will chose some positive level of principles even if the 
profit in the state of a good reputation is lower than in a state of a bad reputation. As 
a result, some comparative statics change. 
Unfortunately, the introducing of an intrinsic interest in principles considerably 
complicates the intertemporal analysis of section 2. The reasons for this 
complication is that the  transition rates not only affect the long-term profits, but 
also the long-term level of principles (analogously defined as (di + fi (dj - di)/h) /ρ, see 
equation (9)). The optimal level of principles in the good state therefore becomes 
dependent on the optimal level of principles in the bad state (and vice versa). This 
generates unattractive mathematical expressions that do not allow easy analytical 
solutions. In order to simplify the presentation, we therefore use a static framework 
instead of a dynamic framework. 
The static framework is similar to the dynamic framework derived in equation 
(9), but differs in two aspects. First, we  introduce a utility function which relates 
utility (e) to both profits and principles. Second, like Quinn (1998), we assume that 
this level of principles impacts the probability of being in a state of a good reputation 
respectively bad reputation. This gives:  
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(13) e = e(w, d)    ∂e/∂w > 0 ; ∂2e/∂w2<0 ; ∂e/∂d > 0 ; ∂2e/∂d2<0 
 
(14) w = pig + g(d) (pib - pig) 0 < g < 1 ; ∂g/∂d < 0 ; ∂2g/∂d2>0 
 
Note the similarity between equation (20) and equation (9). pig and pib are defined as 
in equation (6). 
The first-order condition for maximum utility reads: 
(15) ∂w/∂d + (∂e/∂d)/(∂e/∂w) = 0 
 
Compared to equation (11), equation (21) adds the ratio between marginal utility of 
principles and the marginal utility of expected profits as additional variable. If the 
latter term is positive, the optimal level of principles will not maximize expected 
profits.  
Combining equations (19) - (21), the total differentiation of equation (21) can 
be defined as: 
 
(16) p0 _d = p1 _g + p2 _∂pig/∂d + p3 _∂pib/∂d + p4 _(pig-pib) + p5 _∂g/∂d + p6 _∂e/∂w + 
_∂e/∂d 
 
with p0 = -(∂e /∂w)(∂2w /∂d2) - ∂2e/∂d2 
p1 = - ∂e/∂w (∂pig/∂d - ∂pib/∂d) 
p2 = (∂e/∂w) (1- g) > 0  
p3 = (∂e/∂w) g > 0  
p4 = - (∂e/∂w) (∂g/∂d) > 0  
p5 = ∂e/∂w (pib-pig) 
p6 = ∂w/∂d 
 
Equation (22) differs from equation (12) 
in three major aspects. First, it implies 
that the level of principles will rise if the 
firm attaches more intrinsic value to 
principles, i.e. if ∂e/∂d is higher. If the 
public demand for corporate business responsibility rises, a concern with the 
business ethics  will become part of an inevitable process of professionalization of 
managers (Chryssides and Kaler, 1993). A policy of corporate social responsibility is 
more credible if the managers of the firm intrinsically value principles (Graafland, 
2001b). Firms will therefore be more inclined to appoint CEO’s with a high intrinsic 
value of principles. Extrinsic motivations to raise the corporate social responsibility 
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may thus be internalised and turned into intrinsic motivations. This will raise the 
intrinsic value of principles in the utility function of the company. Graphically, the 
change in the intrinsic value of principles can be illustrated by Figure 3. A shift of the 
iso-utility curve from E1 (with no intrinsic value of principles) to E2 increases the 
optimal level of principles from point A to point B. 
A second difference between equation (12) and equation (22) is that the 
second-order condition p0 > 0 includes an additional term - ∂2e/∂d2. One of the 
consequences is that the hump shape of the PPR curve is not a necessary condition 
for a maximum anymore. Even if the PPR curve is unambiguously negatively sloped, 
an optimal solution can be obtained as long as p0 > 0. 
4 Other external restrictions 
 
In some cases, the model presented in Sections 2 and 3 does not yield an optimal 
solution. In this section we extend the model by introducing two external restrictions 
to the choice-set of the company. First, we assume a minimum standard of 
principles that represents the power of the  government to force a minimum level of 
principles. Next, we introduce a maximum level of principles by assuming a 
minimum level of profitability required to assure the financial continuity of the firm. 
We integrate these restrictions in the model and derive corner solutions. Next, we 
analyse the impact of changes in the minimum required levels of principles and 
profits on the trade-off between profits and principles.  
 
Licence-to-operate restriction 
 
If the second order condition for maximum utility does not hold (i.e. , if (∂e /∂w)(∂2w 
/∂d2) + ∂2e/∂d2 > 0),11 the utility of the company is maximized if principles are equal 
to minus infinite. In reality the set of profit-principle combinations for the company 
will be limited. In particular, several stakeholders may require a minimum level of 
principles. Statements in business reports indicate that this minimum value cannot 
be freely chosen by the firm.12  Indeed, the government, may require that the 
company takes some minimum social responsibility in order to get a licence to 
operate. If the company does not meet this minimum standard, it will not obtain such 
a licence and profits will be zero. In some cases, this licence takes the form of a real 
licence. For example, Shell needs a licence from the Dutch government for its gas 
operations in the Dutch Waddenzee. In order to receive this licence, Shell must 
                                            
11
 Or, in the case of section 2, if the PPR curve is unambigously negatively sloped. 
12
 Like, for example, in the Shell Report 1998 (page 18) ‘To continue, it is essential to have 
endorsement from society - what some call a ‘licence to operate’.  
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convince the politicians that its operations meet the environmental standard and that 
it will not harm the unique environment of the Waddenzee. 
Ethical imperatives regarding the behaviour of individuals or organisations 
often enter economic analysis as constraints in the choice problem (Hurley, 2000). 
Figure 4 reflects the introduction of this licence-to-operate restriction. In this case, 
the intersection point A between the downward sloping PPR curve and the minimum 
level of principles required to obtain a licence to operate reflects the optimal choice 
of the company. 
 
The minimum profit restriction 
 
In some cases, companies may attach a high weight to principles. Indeed, 
companies like the ASN bank are well known for their high ethical standards and are 
intrinsically motivated to pursue these (Scott and Rothman, 1994). If ∂e/∂d / ∂e/∂w is 
extremely large, the company may prefer a point with a very high level of principles 
and extremely low or negative level of profit. In such a case, the choice set of the 
company will be also limited. In particular, the capital market will demand that firms 
meet a certain minimum level of profitability. This happened, for example, with 
Consumer Unity Insurance Company. Founder Gibbons funded a local youth group 
in Washington D.C. and promised each of the children who joined that if they stayed 
drug-free, Consumer United would pay their way through college. Such largesse 
drew attention of insurance industry regulators. They were not convinced that 
Gibbons’ policy guaranteed enough 
future cash to pay claims and sought a 
court order declaring Consumers United 
insolvent. In 1993, the company was shut 
down (Daviss, 1999). 
 
A general framework 
 
Both the licence-to-operate restriction 
and the minimum profitability restriction 
limit the solution set of the company and 
give rise to corner solutions. Figure 5 provides an encompassing framework.13 
                                            
13
 Alternatively, these external restrictions can be interpreted as discontinuities in the PPR 
curve. 
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If the marginal impact of 
principles on expected profit is positive, 
any company will raise its principles up 
to the border of the win-win perspective 
in point A. There are three reasons why 
firms may choose a point further at the 
right than point A.14 First, the level of 
principles at point A may be insufficient 
to receive a licence to operate. 
Suppose, for example, that d,- denotes 
the minimum level of principles to attain such a licence. That means, only points at 
the right of point B belong to the part of the PPR curve that the firm can choose. If 
profit is the only goal of the firm, the firm will choose this corner solution. Second, if 
firms only strive at the maximization of principles, they will raise the level of 
principles to the point where the level of profitability is restricted by the minimum 
profitability (w,-) required to assure the financial continuity of the firm. In Figure 5 this 
is reflected by the corner solution point D. Third, if the company attaches an intrinsic 
value both to profits and to principles and is not limited by either the 
licence-to-operate restriction or the minimum profitability restriction, the optimal 
solution is at the point of tangency between the iso-utility curve and the PPR-curve 
in point C. 
Taking the licence-to-operate restriction and the minimum profitability 
restriction into account requires a reformulation of the optimal level of principles by 
distinguishing three types of solutions: 
 
(23a) d = d* ; w = w* if d* ≥d,- and w*≥w,- 
(23b) d = d,- ; w = w,ˆ  if d* < d,- and w*≥w,- 
(23c) d = d,ˆ ; w = w,-  if d* ≥d,- and w*<w,- 
 
where d* and w* denote the optimal level of principles respectively expected profits 
for the unrestricted firm derived in Section 3, w,ˆ the profit level if d=d,- and d,ˆ the 
level of principles if w= w,- . w,ˆ  and d,ˆ  can both be derived from the 
profit-principles restriction equation (20) by substituting d respectively w by d,- 
respectively w,- and solving for w respectively d. 
 
Change in the licence-to-operate restriction 
 
                                            
14
 For an illustration of these alternatives with statements from Shell reports, see Graafland 
(2001a, 2001c). 
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As described in the introduction, one of the causes of the increased interest in the 
social responsibility of firms is the diminished role of the government. The growing 
dynamics in the economy because of 
the increasing speed of technological 
innovations reduce the effective power 
of the government to control the 
environmental and social effects of the 
production processes of corporations. 
Moreover, the  internationalisation of 
the economy makes it easier for 
companies to allocate their activities to 
countries where government regulation 
is less stringent.  
This trend may be interpreted as a reduction in  the minimum level of 
principles required to receive a licence to operate. The way how firms respond to 
this change depends on the location of their iso-utility curve. This is illustrated by 
Figure 6. If the representative firm only strives to profit maximisation (E1) and the 
minimum required level of principles shifts from d,- 1 to d,- 2, it will fully 
accommodate to the new lower minimum level of principles and chose the corner 
solution at the (new) minimum principle restriction. In case of a large shift from d,-1 
to d,-3 the firm will deviate from the corner solution at the licence-to-operate 
restriction and prefer the level of principles that maximizes expected profits. At this 
point, a further reduction in the level of principles will decrease profits which is not in 
the interest of the firm. If the representative firm attaches an intrinsic value to 
principles (E2), it will find its optimal level of principles in between d,-1 and d,-2 and 
will not fully accommodate its level of principles to the new minimum. Whereas in the 
old situation the firm was forced to maintain the minimum level of principles set by 
external actors, this firm now voluntarily sets its principles higher than is minimally 
required in the new situation. That means: the firm becomes positively interested in 
corporate social responsibility. Not because the utility function of the firm changes, 
but rather because the point of tangency between the iso-utility curve and the PPR 
curve becomes relevant. If the representative firm has a high intrinsic value to 
principles (E3), it will not change its balance between profits and principles at all. 
This analysis illustrates that the recent interest of companies in social 
responsibility is not necessarily good news from a social point of view. Indeed, 
insofar this interest is a response to the decreasing ability of the government to 
extort a certain level of principles, the rising interest of companies actually goes 
together with a reduction in the level of ethical standards itself. Hence, the causality 
between an increasing interest of companies in social responsibility and the social 
effects of these companies might be inverse. This may one of the explanations why, 
 
  20 
for example, 15  some empirical 
cross-section studies like Kohut and 
Corriher (1994) and Marnburg (2000) 
find no positive impact of the existence 
of ethical codes on the ethical standards 
of companies using these codes. 16 
Indeed, international companies 
operating in an environment with weak 
government controls might need ethical 
codes to protect themselves against too 
low levels of ethical standards, whereas 
local firms subject to stringent government controls do not. 
   
Change in the minimum profit restriction 
 
                                            
15
 For other explanations, see, for example, Kaptein and Wempe (1998). 
16
 It should be noted, however, that some other studies do find a positive relationship between 
codes of ethics and perceptions of ethical behaviour. See, for example, J.S. Adams et. al. (2001) and 
Vardi (2001). 
Another implication of the increased globalization and transparency of the economy 
is an increased mobility of capital. This may also impact the balance between profits 
and principles. In particular, it might raise the minimum level of profitability required 
by the capital market. Firms with a relatively low expected profitability compared to 
their competitors will face more difficulties in attracting new capital to finance their 
investments and become an object for take over by more profitable firms if the 
capital market becomes more transparent and transaction costs decline. 
The actual impact of changes in the minimum standard depends again on the 
location of the iso-utility curve of the representative firm (see Figure 7). If the 
representative firm attaches a relatively high intrinsic value to principles (as reflected 
by the iso-utility curve E1), a rise in the minimum required profitability from w,-1 to 
w,-2 will induce a shift from point A to B. As a result, the level of principles falls and 
the firm will shift from an unrestricted solution to a corner solution at the minimum 
profit restriction. If the minimum level of profitability will rise to w,-3, the company 
has no freedom at all to prefer a level of principles other than d2. Otherwise, it faces 
a risk that the financial basis of the company collapses. 
Finally, we note that public corporations are more likely to be bound to the 
minimum profit restriction than closely held companies like family owned companies. 
As family companies are not directly subject to the market forces on the capital 
market, their minimum required profitability will generally be lower than that of public 
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corporations. Hence, there is more freedom for family owned firms to live up with 
their principles. This illustrates that there are several ethical aspects of turning a 
family company into a public corporation. 
 
5 Summary and future research 
 
The retreat of the government, the globalization and growing dynamics of the 
economy create a vacant responsibility for firms to consider the social and 
environment effects of their operations. Other trends, like a higher environmental 
and social concern of consumers and an increased role of NGOs and the media, 
create an incentive for firms to fill this vacant responsibility. This paper analyses how 
these trends affect the firms’ choice between profits and principles. 
For this purpose, section two develops a partial equilibrium model that 
describes the trade-off between short-term profits and long-term reputation effects. If 
the relationship between profits and principles is characterized by a hump shape, we 
can derive that the optimal balance between profits and principles shifts in favour of 
principles if the marginal impact of principles on the transition rate between a state 
of a good and bad reputation is higher; if the transition rates are lower; if the rate of 
time preference is lower; if the impact of principles on short-term profits is less 
negative; if the loss in profits after losing a good reputation is higher; or if the 
competitiveness on the goods market is weaker. The last finding suggests that there 
might also be negative welfare effects to an active antitrust policy of the government. 
Furthermore, we find that firms with a bad reputation may chose for a higher level of 
principles than firms with a good reputation if the marginal impact of principles on 
the probability of regaining a good reputation is relatively high. 
Next, we assume that the firm can also attach an intrinsic value to principles. 
It is shown that a rise in the intrinsic value of principles increases the level of 
principles. Another interesting result is that the hump shape of the relationship 
between profits and principles is not a necessary condition for a maximum anymore 
because of the intrinsic value attached to principles. 
Finally, in some cases the model does not yield an optimal solution, because 
the second order condition is not met. Indeed, if principles only create additional 
costs without generating any benefits, some firms may find it optimal to chose an 
infinitely low level of principles which will not be accepted by the society. For this 
reason, the model is extended by two external restrictions introducing discontinuities 
in the trade-off between profits and principles by assuming that the firm must meet 
some minimum levels for both profits and principles. It is shown that firms may react 
in a different way to changes in these external restrictions. For example, a reduction 
in the level of principles minimally required to obtain a licence to operate will be fully 
accommodated by a firm that only strives at profit maximisation, whereas firms 
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attaching an intrinsic value to both profits and principles may only partially adapt 
their level of principles. This analysis shows that the increased interest of companies 
in corporate social responsibility is not necessarily good news if it is provoked by a 
reduction in the ethical standards as a result of a weakening of government control. 
The model leaves open some questions which should be dealt with in future 
research. For example, in the model the competitiveness on the goods market and 
the loss in market shares due to a loss of reputation are described by two 
independent parameters. However, in reality one would expect these parameters to 
be related. If different goods are highly substitutable, competitiveness will be strong, 
but so will be the consumer reactions to incidents showing unethical behaviour of the 
firm. If substitution is relatively easy because goods are highly homogenous and 
have an almost equal price (like, for example, in the case of petrol), punishing 
unethical behaviour of a particular firm by a consumer boycott is relatively cheap for 
consumers. Another interesting extension of the model is to endogenize the capital 
market operations of the firm by assuming a more continuous relationship between 
the profitability and the ability to attract financial means from the capital market and 
by taking into account that the ethical standard also affects this relationship. A final 
idea for future research is to consider principal agent problems. Managers may have 
their own preferences, which differ from those of the principals.  
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Appendix First and second-order effects of principles on profits 
 
Principles and short-term profits 
 
The marginal impact of principles on short-term profits equals: 
 
(A1) ∂pii/∂di = (1-η)  ξ δi c(di)-η ∂c(di)/∂di < 0 
 
which depends negatively on the degree of competition (η), the autonomous market 
share (δ) and the marginal impact of principles on the cost per unit product ∂c(di)/∂di. 
The second-order impact of principles on short-term profits is equal to: 
 
(A2) ∂2pii/∂di2 = - η (1-η) ξ δi c(di)-η-1 (∂c(di)/∂di)2 + (1-η) ξ δi c(di)-η ∂2c(di)/∂di2 
 
which is negative if ∂2ci/∂di2 > η (∂ci/∂di)2/ci. The difference in profit between a state 
of a good and a bad reputation is equal to: 
 
(A3) pig - pib =  ξ c(dg)-η{δg - δb (c(db)/c(dg))-η} 
 
If dg > db, the profit differential is positive if δg / δb > (c(dg)/c(db))1/η and depends 
positively on δg and negatively on δb. If the profit differential is positive, it depends 
negatively on η. 
 
Principles and long-term profits 
 
The second-order effect of principles on long-term profits equals: 
 
(A4) ∂2wi /∂di2= (1- fi/h){∂2pii/∂di2 + (∂2fi/∂di2-2(∂fi/∂di)2/h) (pij - pii) /h - 2 (∂fi/∂di) (∂pii/∂di) 
/ h}  
 
As is shown by Box 2, the sign of ∂2wi/∂di2 is ambiguous. For example, if the 
short-term costs rise degressive (progressively) with principles, the first term will be 
positive (negative). Similarly, if the profits in a state of a bad reputation exceeds the 
profits in a state of a good reputation, the second term might also be positive. 
 
Box 2 Second order effects of principles on long-term profits 
 
Reputation 
 
∂2pii/∂di2 
 
∂2fi/∂di2-2(∂fi/∂di)2/h  
 
(pij - pii) 
 
-2(∂fi/∂di) ∂pii/∂di / h 
 
good  
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
 − 
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bad ? 
− 
?  + 
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